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Judicial Tendencies of the Court of
Appeals During the Incumbency
of Chief Judge Hiscock*
LEONARD C. CROUCHt
Holdsworth, in his recently published work on the Sources and
Literature of English Law,' shows us that there came a time in the
later years of the I3 th century when it is apparent that the day for
philosophical treatises on the law, such as Bracton's, had gone by.
"The common law," says he, "was becoming a special subject known
only to practitioners of the royal courts; and what these practitioners
wanted was short rules about writs, up-to-date knowledge of the
rules of procedure, the most recent cautelae or tips in the art of
tripping up an opponent. But these rules could best be learned by
attending to the decisions of the courts." Philosophy was left to the
impractical and the day of the case lawyer began. The American
lawyer of the late i 8th century found it useful to have certain con-
scious dealings with philosophy, but when the Revolution was over,
the constitution adopted and a small, healthy and growing body of
case law stood on the shelves, he found himself wanting substantially
the same things as his i 3 th century brother. Since then the rationale
of his art has, for the most part, been to find a case in point, and,
failing that, to urge upon the court the necessity for a development
of law to cover his client's case.2 Curiously enough, when he was
forced to the latter course, he was dealing with the stuff of philoso-
phy, though it is fair to say that he probably did not know it.
It has been authoritatively stated that the process of judicial
decision in the doubtful case-'"when the balancewavers"-is swayed
consciously or unconsciously by ultimate conceptions. The lawyer
who argues and the judge who decides the case deal, as to the question
in hand, with the origin, with the growth, and especially with the
*An address delivered before the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Cornell Law
Association, November 13, 1926.
tAssociate Justice of the Appellate Division, Supreme Court, 4th Department.
'P. 35.
2Cf. (1926) 4o HARv. L. REV. 144, 145.
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end or aim of the principle of law involved. That means, whether
the lawyer or judge realizes it or not, that he is dealing with the phil-
osophy of law.3
For the most part this philosophy is the potent factor which
controls and measures the adjustment of law to life. With the thing
itself lawyers and judges have always been more or less familiar.
Judge Pound has said:
"What is antiquated today was once modem and practical.
Call it sociological justice or any other hard name from the
vocabulary of technical philosophy as you will, the courts have
always in a greater or less degree given ear to those who con-
tend for a modification of the old rule to conform to modem
conditions. ' 4
He mentions Sir Matthew Hale, who in spite of a belief in witch-
craft, was yet able to state modern doctrines in a modem way when
once they had been established outside of courts of justice. The work
of Coke in making over mediaeval law," of Holt and Mansfield in
settling the principles of modem commercial law,6 and of Kent
in working out a body of law applicable to the then prevailing con-
ditions in our own state, are other instances)' As applied to a partic-
ular doctrine, an illustration may be found in the history of the
master's liability for the acts of his servant, which shows four stages
of development by decisions of the courts under the influence of
changing conditions and opinions. 8
The phrase used by Judge Pound to qualify the statement that the
courts have always given ear to the plea for progress was well chosen.
"In a greater or less degree" is a qualification in which is implied a
varying and uneven growth. There have been periods when the law
was well nigh static, not so much, ,perhaps, because the ear of the
courts was unwilling as because social conditions were static or
because the prevailing philosophy seemed to demand rigidity. There
have been other periods when the law, like life itself, was informed
with a quickening spirit, ready to put a doubtful doctrine to the test
of reality, and, if found wanting, to scrap it, if possible; 9 if not, to
circumvent it by methods well known and occasionally resorted
3CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924) 25.4Cuthbert W. Pound, The Relation of the Practicing Lawyer to the Efficient
Administration of Justice (1924) 9 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 242.
6HOLDSWORTH, SOURCES AND LITERATURE OF ENGLISH LAW (1925), 140.
6LoRD BIRKENHEAD, FOURTEEN ENGLISH JUDGES (1926), 186; POLLOCK,
THE GENIUS OF THE CosmzoN LAW (1911), 83, 84.
PouND, THE SPIRIT OF THE Co iMoN LAW (1921), 113.8VINOGRADOFF, COMSION SENSE IN LAW, (1920) 193-195.
90ppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N. Y. I56, 140 N. E. 227 (1923) is an instance.
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to;1O or, as a last resort, to pass it on for legislative treatment."
While one speaks of periods, lines of demarcation cannot always
be sharply drawn. The law, again like life, is a continuous tapestry
with the figures of one stage gradually merging into those of the next.
It is a matter of common knowledge, however, that the transition
from the social life of the i 9 th century to that of the 2oth has been
swift and striking. So great has been the change that one might
almost say there had been a break in social continuity. A competent
critic, reviewing the mass of literature in every field dealing with the
political and social conditions of the last century, said recently:
"The prime cause of these many books in which the American
past becomes vivid and often romantic is that nineteenth centu-
ry America is gone, is dead, except in its influences, is histori-
cally remote, and widely different from our present. We read
of the New England 'Forties or of the South in Reconstruction
or of Henry Ward- Beecher or Grover Cleveland as we read in
Plutarch, Clarendon, or Macauley."
A number of those books deal with the social life of the 'Nineties.
They bear titles intended to characterize the period-"The Yellow
'Nineties," "The Mauve Decade," "The Romantic 'Nineties," and,
most suggestive of all, "The Moulting 'Nineties." Moulting indeed
they were. Old standards of social conduct and economic relations
began to drop away, to be replaced by others unforeseen and almost
undreamed of. The time was instinct with the spirit of change.
It was thought of as the end of an era, and so it was.
The frontier and free land vanished together; population began to
thicken and to become preponderantly urban; the corporation
succeeded the individual operator, and the trust succeeded the small
corporation; immigration poured foreign material into the melting
pot so fast that the melting well-nigh ceased, with the result that
the Puritan standards of moral conduct were crowded to the wall;12
and just on the horizon were the automobile, the aeroplane, the
radio, and the whole sweep of mechanical and scientific advance.
Out of this welter of economic, industrial and social changes came
to the courts novel and unheard-of problems," not to be solved by
precedents, for there were none; nor to be satisfactorily solved
by analogies drawn from history and from settled and existing
principles. It may be admitted that the courts generally did not
10PouND, Supra note 7 at I66, 167.
"Cammack v. Slattery & Bro. Inc., 241 N. Y. 39, 148 N. E. 781 (1925).
"2Cf. People v. Klinck Packing Co., 214 N. Y. 121 at 128, lO8 N. E. 278 (1915).
18Elihu Root, Judicial Decisions and Public Feeling, 35 NEW YORK STATE BAR
AssocIATioN REPORTS (1912) 148, 151, 152.
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quickly grasp the significance of the changing conditions. The
failure to do so led not only to discontent with and criticism of
the courts as governmental agencies-something which was not
entirely unknown-but it led also to an attack upon the common
law itself, something which had never happened before.' 4 The chief
source of the. discontent was in the constitutional decisions constru-
ing legislative acts, dealing with social and industrial problems.
This led, to demands or proposed remedies whereby constitutional
power, as between the courts and the legislature, should be re-ad-
justed.15
But the attack was extended to the whole body of law with a
somewhat shrill demand that law be made consonant with justice-
"justice" meaning the ethical concepts of Main Street.16 The tend-
ency war away from an extreme of government of laws and not of
men.; a tendency, perhaps, toward the continental theory of free
legal decision. The criticism which began at the turn of the century
was, well marked in its tendencies by r9o6, when Judge Hiscock first
went, on the Courtof Appeals, and reached its climax in the progressive
years of 1912 and- 1913. That the judges of our courts during those
years did not readily break away from established doctrine, is not
strange to those of us whose earlier training was in the same school
of thought. If you will step across the campus with me and go for a
few moments to the top floor of Morrill Hall, where, -in the early
'Nineties, the Law School carried on in a few dreary rooms, I will
show you briefly what that training was. The first concept there
drilled into us was that the end or aim of law was to secure to the indi-
vidual certain natural and inalienable rights. We were so informed
by the Declaration of Independence-and also, as I remember it,
by Dean Hutchins, under whom we had "the misfortune"'17 to read
both the introduction and the opening chapter to the first book of
Blackstone's. Connmentaries-at least so much of them as were in-
cluded in the Second Edition of Chase'.s Blackstone, current in the
year i8go. And on page 78 of that edition you will find these words:
"The third absolute right inherent in every Englishman is
that of property; which consists in the free use and enjoyment
and disposal of all his acquisitions without any control or dini-
14Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law? (1905) 5 COL. L. REV. 339;
WoodrowWilson, The-Lawyer and the Community, 35 AERICAN BAR ASSOcIATIOz+
REPORTS (19io) 419.
16ALGER, THE OLD LAW AND THE NEW ORDER (1913) 34; RANSOM, MAJORITY
RULE AND THE JUDICIARY (1912); DAVIS, THE JUDICIAL VETO. (1914).15ABBoTTi JUSTICE AND THE MODERN LAw, (1913) chi. I. Cf. the pioneer
conception of justice, Roscoe Pound, supra note 7 at 113, 118
17(1905) 5 COL. L. REV. 352.
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nution, save only by the laws of the land * * * * So great, more-
over, is the regard of the law for private property that it will
not authorize the least violation of it; no, not evenfor the general
good of the whole community * * * * Besides, the public good is in
nothing more essentially interested than in the protection of
every individual's private rights. In vain it may be urged that
the good of the individual ought to yield to that of the com-
munity; for it would be dangerous to allow any private man,
or even any public tribunal, to be the judge of this common
good, and to decide whether it be expedient or no."
And so when we encountered the then recently decided case of In
Re Jacobs,8 which permitted Mr. Jacobs to continue making cigars
in his own home, although forbidden to do so by statute enacted
to meet the social need of health regulation, it seemed entirely
sound to us, philosophically and otherwise. And we noted it as a
useful authority in the event some future client should be hauled up
for doing what he had always done, though told by the legislature
that he must stop.
So a few years later, when Knisley v. Pratt9 held that a woman
employee injured by a machine left unguarded by her employer
contrary to the statute, might not recover because she had assumed
the risk, few of us appreciated the evil of the holding. Any other
doctrine would have seemed to us, as it did to the Court, new and
startling. Was it to be said that a woman upwards of twenty-one
years of age was not at liberty to contract to take the risk in order to
get the job? She, like her employer, was a free agent; they had
equal rights. If she did not want the job on those terms, she could go
elsewhere. Adam Smith, Mill and Spencer had told us so. A new
breed of fanatics called sociologists were beginning to say that under
actual industrial conditions this was not so, but to us they spoke
without authority.
As the years went by, some of us, perhaps, caught the drift of the
times and came to suspect that the number of those "unwritten and
unchanging laws of heaven-laws that are not of today or yesterday,
but abide forever, and of their creation knoweth no man" were
somewhat fewer than we had been told was the case. But most of
us, I think, were as static as the courts.
The long succession of decisions in the 'Nineties and in the first
ten or twelve years of the present century, holding unconstitutional
many acts of the legislature which interfered with the property
rights and freedom of contract of the individual, seemed to most
1898 N. Y. 98 (1885).
19148 N. Y. 372, 42 N. E. 986 (1896).
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of us sound law and socially desirable. If any doubt came as a
result of the close decision by the Court of Appeals in the Lochner
case,20 holding the bakeshop law constitutional, it was removed when
the Supreme Court reversed that decision.2 1
In the zone of private law our attitude was the same. When
Stokes v. Stokes22 said flatly that neither party to a contract was
entitled to specific performance unless the other was likewis6 entitled,
the doctrine was filed away in our minds as expressing a definite,
easily understood and perfectly fair rule. That its implication ran
counter to modem business practice did not occur to us any more
than it did to the Court. Equally definite and fixed, although
equally opposed to common business practice, was our understand-
ing that a contract which contained no literal promise by one of
the parties lacked mutuality and was unenforceable. The mere
aroma of obligation would have seemed to us too thin to grasp. We
had been taught to regard certainty in the law as essential. If
the business practice of merchants did not conform to the rule of law,
so much the worse for the merchants. Moreover, if one of our
early clients had bought a wagon from a local dealer and one of its
wheels had crumpled, thereby injuring him, it is very doubtful
whether we should have advised him to sue the manufacturer. In
fact, if we had refreshed our knowledge of the law by looking at the
opinion in Thomas v. Winchester3 we would have found from an
illustration there used that there could be no recovery in such a case.
"Misfortune to third persons," said the court, "not parties to the con-
tract, would not be a natural and necessary consequence of the
builder's negligence." This, of course, was contrary to the actual
facts of life, but we, having been taught the distinction between
legal and actual probability, accepted it as good law.24
The 19th century was a period of individualism. In politics, a
minimum of government was best;25 in economics, free competition
was essential; and in law the preservation of the rights of persons
and property, including freedom of contract, was fundamental.
Except as he himself had willed the existence of a relation to which
the law attached a sanction, an individual was to be free from ex-
action; nor was he to be liable unless for a fault.26 Some limitations
20People v. Lochner, I77 N. Y. 145, 69 N. E. 373 (1904).21Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937 (1905).
22148 N. Y. 708, 43 N. E. 211 (1896).
236 N. Y. 397 (1852); nor would Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470 (1882) have
changed our view.2 Cf. BOELEN, STUDIES l THE LAW OF TORTS (1925) 113.25 People v. Coler, 166 N. Y. I at 14, 59 N. E. 716 (igoi).26Cf. Cullen, C. J., in Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N. Y. 27I at 318,94 N. E.
431 ('9"I).
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on those rights were recognized as inevitable in a social state, but
for that defect the courts consoled themselves by the thought, as
Judge Earl pointed out in Losee v. Buchanan,2 7 that each individual
was compensated by the similar operation of those limitations
on the rights of his neighbor; and in any event, those rights were not
to be unnecessarily infringed. It is needless to multiply instances.
With such a background we may forgive both the Court and our-
selves for a failure fully to appreciate the social and economic forces
involved and to yield at once to demands which meant the overturn
of reasonably fixed and settled principles, so slowly and painfully
worked out.
28
Following those years of hesitation in the face of discontent and
hostile criticism, came, and are still coming, certain definite results
and certain tendencies. Among them are:
I. The setting up of administrative tribunals of many kinds,
where, within limits, executive justice is administered, and, it is to be
hoped, administered as the ordinary man conceives that it should
be.29 The Court of Appeals has for the most part dealt liberally
with the questions arising in this new field. For instance, in con-
nection with the Workmen's Compensation Law, after a somewhat
reactionary decision holding that proof of a claim by hearsay evi-
dence alone was insufficient, 0 came the Katz,3 ' the Heidemann,32
and other cases, giving broad and non-technical holdings on the ques-
tion of what constitutes an accident arising out of employment.
2. Procedural Reform. This is a subject by itself, and may not be
here considered beyond saying that both the Practice Act and
the decisions under it have been subject to criticism more or less
justified.3
3. A tendency, at least, toward a new philosophy of law, so far
as the end or aim of law-and hence its growth-is concerned. The
change may first be stated in the language of Dean Pound. The law,
he says, now "appears to put emphasis upon social interests; upon
the demands or claims or desires involved in social life rather than
* ** upon the freedom of will of the isolated individual."3 4
275i N. Y. 476, 484 (1873).
28PoU-D, supra note 7 at 19I; HOLMES, COLLECTED WORKS (1920), 294, 295.
29RoscoE POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1922) 135 et seg.
Cuthbert W. Pound, The .Jidiial Power, (1922) 35 HARV. L. REV. 787.30Matter of Carroll, 218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507 (1916).
3232 N. Y. 42o, 134 N. E. 330 (1922).
3223o N. Y. 305, 13o N. B. 302 (1920).
DSee for one example out of many, (1926) 26 COL. L. REv. 3o.
4POUND, SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921) 195; and see for a more complete
statement, POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, (1922).
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One who without previous training or study attempts to pursue
and capture the ultimate concepts of law formulated by one juristic
philosopher after another through most of recorded time will prob-
ably agree with Henry Adams. who once cynically said that philos-
ophy consisted chiefly in suggesting unintelligible answers to in-
soluble problems. Putting aside, then, the language of philosophy,
this later trend may be described by saying that in the decision of
cases the courts have come to put an increased emphasis on the
conditions of actual life to which the law is to be applied, where
such conditions are at all involved, and less upon the terms of the
law itself. Or, if we go back to what seems to me to be a classic
statement of the 19th century attitude, the opinion of Judge Earl
in Losee v. Buchanan," the change may be defined as a greater willing-
ness to promote the general welfare at the price of infringing on
individual rights.
The effect of this tendency, so far as the Court of Appeals is
concerned, has been admirably set forth by Judge Hiscock in his
Quarterly article on Th6 Progressiveness of New York Law.36 To the
cases there discussed one or two others may be added for illustration,
and then, as casting a back-light on the process of development,
reference may be made briefly to several others where the Court was
invited, but declined, to depart from settled rules.
In Schnitzer v. Lang,37 goods received by a buyer and laid away in
January were not found to be of unmerchantable quality until
August. Under various precedents, delay for an arbitrary period had
come to be held unreasonable as matter of law, without reference to
circumstances. The Court here brought the rule back to realities
by holding that mere lapse of time was not alone the test. The ques-
tion was whether under all the circumstances of the particular case,
the delay was reasonable or unreasonable.
With that decision may be contrasted another3 s where the question
of reasonable time under a bill of 'ading not covered by federal law
was, on grounds of public policy, tested, not by the particular cir-
cumstances, but by the time provision of the federal law. Consist-
ency and certainty of rule were apparently balanced against the need
of equity and fairness in particular cases, and the former were found
weightier."9
Supra note 27.S(I924) 9 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 371.
7,239 N. Y. 1, 145 N. E. 65 (1924).38S & C. A. C. Co. v. P. R. Co., 237 N. Y. 287, 142 N. E. 666 (1923).
a9Cf. Jacobs & Youngv. K ent, 23o N. Y . 239,2 4 3, 129 N. E. 889 (1921) where a
somewhat similar process led to an opposite result.
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Robinson v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Company4" seems to have
been a frankly pragmatic holding. By a decision of the U. S. Supreme
Court, the State Compensation Law was held not to apply to maritime
employment. Upon the justifiable supposition that it did, plaintiff
had previously been granted relief thereunder for the death of her
husband. When the decision came down, her action at law was
barred by the lapse of time. The legislature passed a law which
provided that persons in plaintiff's plight might commence an
action after the time limited by general law. Defendant here at-
tacked its constitutionality, and a divided court held it valid under
the police power. It was recognized that in some cases the bar
of the statute is a property right; but so to hold here would, in
the words of the opinion, be "contrary to all prevailing ideas of
justice."
With that decision one may contrast Matter of Beach v. Veizy,
in the same volume of reports,4' where, in a compensation proceeding,
the Court refused to stretch the doctr ne of liability without fault
beyond the limits fixed by the legislature, though the case was in a
way one of hardship.
In St. Regis Paper Co. v. Hubbs & Hastings Paper Co.,4" a buyer of
paper entered into a contract for a stated amount per year for two
years. The price for the first three months was fixed by the contract,
which further provided that future quarterly prices were to be fixed
by mutual agreement, and if the parties did not agree, the contract
should terminate. There came such failure, and the seller repudiated.
To the argument that the contract carried with it the fundamental
obligation on the seller in good faith to attempt to agree, the Court
pointed to the literal language, and said it was merely an agreement
to agree, which could not be enforced.
In another case there was a similar contract, which, however,
provided that the price to be agreed upon should not be more than
was then charged to large consumers by another seller. When the
time came to fix the price, the buyer demanded deliveries accordingly.
The seller refused to comply and repudiated. The holding was
as before.4
40238 N. Y. 271, 144 N. E. 579 (1924).
41238 N. Y. I00, 143 N. E. 805 (1924).
235 N. Y. 30, 138 N. E. 495 (1923). The trial judge, perhaps reflecting
morality as it prevailed at least in theory, had told the jury that a broad good
faith was written by the law into the contract. He later concluded 
he h  been
mistaken and set the verdict aside. The Appellate Division (20 App. 
Div.
397, 194 N. Y. Supp. 150, 4th Dept. 1922) thought the time was at hand when
the law of the charge should prevail and reinstated the verdict.
43Sun P. & P. Co. v. Remington P. & P. Co., 235 N. Y. 338, 139 N. E. 470
(1923).
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The time had not come when social interest in the exaction of
ordinary business morality could outweigh the need of certainty in
business transactions.
The Court in the Kridel case,44 cited in Judge Hiscock's article,
found in present day actualities sufficient reason for overturning
immemorial authority and giving to a wife a right of action against
another woman for criminal conversation. A year or two before, in
Drobner v. Peters,45 the Court felt it would be judicial legislation to
sustain a right of action in an infant injured eleven days before birth
when his mother fell into a negligently uncovered coal hole. While
the lack of precedent is referred to, that objection was not insuper-
able;4 nor was the physiological objection that until birth the child
had no existence apart from the mother; the decision seems to rest
on the last paragraph of the opinion, which indicates a distrust of the
prevailing mores in the preparation and trial of negligence actions.
The obiter holding in Lanyon's Detective Agency v. Cochrane,4 7
that a husband is not liable for services rendered to a wife in an action
for absolute divorce against him because such an action is to dissolve
the marital relationship and not to protect the wife in her condition
as such, seems to rest on a logic out of touch with realities.
In Glanzer v. Shepard,48 a public weigher at the request of the seller
certified a weight of beans to the buyer, knowing that payment would
be made on the faith of the certificate. The certified weight was
wrong and the buyer was permitted to recover, although there was
no privity. The opinion says there is nothing new in principle;'
that one in a common calling may owe a duty to B, though A give
the order or make payment. It seems to be an extension of the rule
in the MacPherson case.49 But in the later case of Jaillet v. Cash-
man, 0 the Court refused to hold one who furnished ticker service to a
broker, for misinformation acted on by one of the broker's customers
to his injury.5
In Harris v. Shorall52 the Court in effect gave notice that outworn
and inconvenient consequences flowing from the use of a seal on
written instruments, as, for instance, that there could be no modi-
fication by parole, would be done away with. When the Court
440ppenheim v. Kridel, supra note 9.
4232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567 (1921).
46Kujek v. Goldman, i5o N. Y. 176, 44 N. E. 773 (1896).
4724o N. Y. 274, 148 N. E. 520 (1925).
48233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922).
492 17 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. ioso (19x6).
50235 N. Y. 511, 139 N. E. 714 (1923).
5lCf. BOHLEN, supra note 24, at I5O, 151.
52230 N. Y. 343, 13o N. B. 572 (1921).
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came sharply to the point in Crowley v. Lewis 3 and Cammack v.
Slattery & Bro., Inc.,54 however, it seemed unwise to upset settled
rules, when, jn consequence of existing rights and otherwise, it would
be necessary to make exceptions and reservations beyond the power of
the Court. The step in advance was left to be taken by the legis-
lature.
A consideration of the foregoing cases, including those mentioned
by Judge Hiscock, and of others which may not, for lack of time, be
specifically referred to, seems to leave the present status of socio-
logical justice-a hard name, as Judge Pound says-in the Court
of Appeals, somewhat as follows:
i. In dealing with the police power, the court has developed the
doctrine from the narrow limits which grudgingly permitted re-
straint on personal liberty only when its exercise affected safety,
health and morals55 to the point where Judge Hiscock says" it may
so deal with conditions as they exist "as to bring out of them the
greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or
general prosperity." And that statement may well rest on the strik-
ing definition of the police power in the La Fetra case57 as "a dynamic
agency, vague and undefined in scope, which takes private property
or limits its use when great public needs require, uncontrolled by the
constitutional requirement of due process."
2. Wherever standards of action are involved, whether in torts
(as in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.)5" or incidentally in contracts
(as in Schnitzer v. Lang)5 9 or in the uncertain ground between (as in
Glanzer v. Shepard)0 there has been a sustained tendency to establish
rules on a basis of social utility; and that in general means a greater
measure of what informed popular opinion would regard as justice.
But in the field of contracts the supposed need of certainty, or perhaps
the old feeling that it is every man's business at his peril to look
sharply after his own affairs, has prevented the formulation of a
general rule that men should make good reasonable expectations,
reasonably created by their promises or other conduct, and sanc-
tioned by the moral sentiment of the community.
There have been at least three instances in the Court of Appeals
53239 N. Y. 264, 146 N. E. 374 (1925).
&Supra note ii.6Cf. People v. Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 1073 (I9O6).
55Matter of Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N. Y. 288, 298, iSo N. E. 120 (1925).6People ex rel. Durham R. Corp. v. La Fetra, 23o N. Y. 429, 442, I3O N. E.
6o (1921).
58Supra note 49.
59Supra note 37.
60Supra note 48.
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during the period under review, however, where something like this
principle has actually been applied, Judge Hiscock writing for
the court in the first case.61 Section 88 of the American Law Insti-
tute's restatement of contracts formulates such a rule.6 2 Should
that rule hereafter be adopted by the court, a defect of remedy
under the doctrine of consideration will be cured-though the Court,
as in two of the cases above referred to, seems able to find consider-
ation when needed.
The tendency has been most strongly manifested in the field of
torts. Between the Compensation Law, Section 282-e of the High-
way Law (which does what the Court of Appeals refused to do in
Van Blaricom v. Dodgson)0 and a multitude of other statutes on
the one hand, and Martin v. Herzoge and MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co.5 and like decisions on the other, we seem to have gone an appre-
ciable way toward the doctrine of liability without fault. Experi-
enced trial counsel say that under actual operation before a jury the
difficulties of defense in cases of this character are such as almost to
amount to absolute liability; and the possibilities of development
under the res ipsa loquitur rule are worthy of consideration.
3. In scattered instances the Court has wiped out archaic rules
where it could be done without harm to existing rights.
4. In other scattered instances decisions which satisfy one's
ordinary sense of what is right and just, have been reached in spite of
general principles. There is nothing new about that; though one
may now classify such cases as instances where logic, history, custom
or other method of decision has given way to the prevailing mores.
Jacobs & Young v. Kent" and Robinson v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair
Co.6 7 seem to fall into this category.68
This period of storm and stress, the most critical in the history
of the Court, is nearly coincident with the twenty years, now about
ending, of Judge Hiscock's services thereon. It is no part of the
purpose of this paper to attempt a review of his judicial work. That
1Messiah Home for Children v. Rogers, 212 N. Y. 315, io6 N. E. 59 (914);
De Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N. Y. 431, 117 N. E. 807 (1917); Siegelv. Spear & Co.,
234 N. Y. 479, 138 N. E. 414 (1923); and note thereon in (1924) 9 CORNELL
LAW QUARTERLY 54.
6Contracts, RESTATEMENT NO. 2. (1926) 34.
6'22o N. Y. III, 1I5 N. E. 443 (1917).
64228 N. Y. x64, 126 N. E. 814 (1920).
5Supra note 49.6ISupra note 39.67Supra note 40.8SOne wonders whether they are also instances of what Dean Pound had in
mind when he spoke of "judicial revolt from mechanical methods" taking "the
form of 'officious kindness' and flabby equitable applications of law."--Pound,
Mechanical Jurisprudence (19o8) 8 COL. L. REV. 6I5.
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must be left for some scholar who has time, expert kmowledge, and
critical skill. The source material is voluminous and covers the
whole field of law. 9
One may not, however, deal with the tendencies of the Court
during those years without considering to some extent the judicial
attitude of the one man who for all that period has been a member
of the Court, and for half of it has been its Chief.
Enough has been said to indicate the legal training and the philos-
ophy which he brought with him to the Court. He had them in
common with all sound lawyers of his generation. During the
earlier years of his term, the necessity for readjusting the compar-
ative claims of the individual will and the social need came to be
recognized. There need be no pretense that the recognition was
blithely accorded. It was not. While it was in process Judge His-
cock said in the course of one opinion:7°
"The doctrine that personal liberty must yield to what is
supposed to be the public welfare, has not waned any during the
recent years."
And in another he said :71
"We have been passing through days when many people were
prodigal in their generous willingness to devise statutory cures
for other people who neither demanded, desired or needed them."
In 1907 Judge Hiscock concurred with all the other members
of the Court in the decision of People v. Williams,"2 which.held un-
constitutional a provision of the Labor Law limiting the hours
when women might work in factories. It fell to him, in 1915, to
write in People v. Schweinler Press,73 where the Court held a similar
act valid. Whatever may have been the influence of a changed
Court personnel and of a sociological brief, the new point of view was
frankly accepted. "What is reasonable and appropriate in such a
matter," said the opinion, "must be largely decided by prevailing
opinion and judgment and by reference to what has been and is
being done with approval"-elsewhere.
Judge Hiscock did not sit in the Ives case, 74 and his views in the
Schweinler case were clearly foreshadowed by his opinions in People v.
59During his twenty years on the Court of Appeals, the reports, volumes
184 to 243, inclusive, disclose 468 opinions by judge Hiscock, of which 184 were
written during his term as Chief judge.
70People v. Klinck Packing Co., supra note 12 at 126.71People v.Charles Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395, 409, io8 N. E. 639 (1913).
.J89 N. _Y. 131, 81 N. E. 778 (1907).
"Supra note 71.74Supra note 26.
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Erie R. R. Co.,71 Musco v. Surety Co.,7 6 and Hathorn v. Natural Car-
bonic Gas Co.,77 as far back as 19o9. So, when in 1916 he was elected
Chief Judge, he came to the position, for all his nineteenth century
training, clear-eyed to the existence of new social forces which he
must have realized would influence the work of legal development,
and open-minded to weigh them-with the proviso, however, that
they were to be regarded as Greeks bringing gifts. In other words, I
think Judge Hiscock began his work as Chief Judge with a disposition
to be progressive, but to be so cautiously. And that was exactly
the attitude which was required. An examination of volume 220 of
the New York Reports, in which his first opinions as Chief Judge
occur, will afford support for that view. In Matter of Stubbe v.
Adamson,7 8 the question was whether evidence might be introduced
to show that the requirement of a certain ordinance was unreasonable.
After pointing out that the ordinance had acquired the force and
character of a statute, the opinion dealt liberally with the police
power, refused to allow evidence to be adduced to overthrow the pre-
sumption of constitutionality-in other words, accepted the view
of the legislature rather than of a jury as to what the social need
really was; and then ended cannily by saying that it was unnecessary
to determine that no case could possibly arise where such procedure
would be proper. In the same volume, by way of contrast, is Van
Blaricom v. Dodgson,79 where the Court was urged to say that the
owner of an automobile, maintained for the pleasure of his family,
should be liable for a death caused by the negligence of his son while
driving the car for his own purposes. That was asking too much as
things then stood. Judge Hiscock was unable to see-in the language
of the opinion-"that a person who is wholly and exclusively en-
gaged in the prosecution of his own concerns is nevertheless engaged
as agent in doing something for someone else." To him the agency
seemed "theoretical and attenuated." Thatwasten years ago, and in
the meantime the legislature has saved the Court from being called
on to say whether changed conditions would warrant a slight ex-
tension in the law of agency.
One who follows his opinions through the succeeding volumes will
find, I think, that the same attitude has been maintained with some
degree of consistency. It is impossible within the limits of such a
paper as this to point out the evidence in detail. In the field of
76198 N. Y. 369, 91 N. E. 849 (1910).
76196 N. Y. 459, 9o N. E. 171 (1909).
77194 N. Y. 326, 87 N. E. 504 (1909).
78220 N. Y. 459, iI6 N. E. 372 (1917).
79Supra note 63.
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public law the social demand has been steadily recognized and broadly
interpreted. Two instances may be given, because the decisions
show a far-sighted comprehension of problems likely to arise from
the modem tendency toward urban living.8 In one case the defi-
nition of a city purpose was made so broad and so flexible that de-
veloping views can readily be met in the future.81 In another,
which involved the validity of zoning regulations, the inevitable
encroachment on individual rights under modem city conditions is
recognized and sanctioned.8 In the field of private law-and the
attitude is entirely sane-the disposition to broaden has been more
guarded, particularly so in commercial and banking cases. Certainty
in the law-itself a social need-has in these cases had greater
weight than any other demand. For instance, under a letter of
credit the defendant bank paid a draft accompanied by a bill of lading,
which described the article shipped only when supplemented by an
invoice issued by the vendor, who was not the shipper. The article
received by the plaintiff was not the article so described. The court
was asked to say that the defective description in the bill of lading
might not be aided by an invoice made out by the vendor. Judge
Hiscock says:"
"The whole process of authorizing banks to issue letters of
credit under which the purchase price of goods is often paid
for account of the vendee before he has had a chance to examine
them is largely based on confidence in the honesty of the vendor.
If the vendee is suspicious of dishonesty he can guard against
it by appropriate clauses in his contract. But certainly the
courts ought to exercise no power of embarrassing or confusing
widespread processes of commercial life by inserting in such
contracts as this one clauses which it may deem in a particular
case might have been quite properly placed there but which
as matter of fact the parties were content to disregard and omit."
In another instance, plaintiff sought to recover damages sustained
by the delay of defendant in establishing in Bucharest a credit for
2,000,000 lei. The damage claimed was a decline in the market
value of lei. The answer in the opinion is that "it is impossible to
say that the lei, measured by lei, had declined in market value."
In other words, the lei in Bucharest had no market value. Since
the only market for standards of value recognized by the business
world is the market of bankers who deal in exchange, the phrase
"market value", as used in the complaint, might perhaps have been
80Cf. People v. Colantone, 243 N. Y. 134, 152 N.E. 700 (1926), where the set-
tled rule of evidence as to proof of reputation for good character is modified to
meet urban conditions.81Schieffelin v. Hylan, 236 N. Y. 254, 14o N. E. 689 (1923).
8Matter of Wulfsohn v. Burden, supra note 56.
8Laudisi v. American Exchange Nat. Bank, 239 N. Y. 234 at 242 146 N. E.
347 (i924).
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construed to have reference to that market, and not to a market in
Bucharest which did not exist. The established rule, however,
was adhered to.8
The very recent case of Mirizio v. Mirizio 85 presented a strong
appeal to Judge Hiscock's inherent sense of right and justice. It was
open to the Court to so construe the word "misconduct" as to give
flexibility and choice of decision in individual cases. By the term
itself a standard of conduct was involved. But public policy which
has attached definite duties and obligations to the contract of mar-
riage, created a demand for rigidity which outweighed that for the
supple test of prevailing opinion.
Since the tendencies of the Court is the subject matter of this
paper, it has touched the attitude and work of the Chief Judge only
as they seem to be related to those tendencies. The other things
which one would like to say of him, one passes by. To lead a great
court at a critical time was Judge Hiscock's task. He and his asso-
ciates were called upon to know and to measure new forces and to
determine wisely the extent to which they should be guided by
them. It requires "suppleness of mind and heart to see the world
from others' eyes, to think their thoughts with them, to measure
the weight and meaning of their motives and desires." When one is
to deal with "the demands or claims or desires involved in social
life" rather than with the old, fixed, familiar rights and duties,
something more than logical discrimination is needed. Knowledge
of men, experience in affairs, insight into matters of government,
breadth of understanding, and a vision of the future-call it imagi-
nation if you will-are qualities which the judge must have, if he is
to distinguish between demands which are merely of the moment and
those which are of tomorrow. The distinction is vital.8 6
Another great judge once said :817
"As law embodies beliefs that have triumphed in the battle
of-ideas and then have translated themselves into action, while
there is still doubt, while opposite convictions still keep a battle
front against each other, the time for law has not come; the
notion destined to prevail is not yet entitled to the field. It is
a misfortune if a judge reads his conscious or unconscious sym-
pathy with one side or the other prematurely into the law * * *"
To me it seems that the recognition of and steadfast holding to
some such truth constitute one-if not the greatest-of the services
which Judge Hiscock has rendered to the State and to the law.
84Richard v. American Union Bank, 241 N. Y. 163, 149 N. E. 338 (1925).
85242 N. Y. 74, 150 N. E. 605 (1926).86
"A great part of the difficulties in which, at times, courts find themselves
involved, arises from a failure to look forward and see what will be the result
of the rules of law they declare."-Dissenting opinion of Cullen, C. J., in People
ex rel Stabile v. Warden, 2o2 N. Y. z38, 155, 95 N. E. 729 (I9II).87HOLMES, COLLECTED LEG.AL PAPERS (1920) 294, 295.
